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Social Security benefits are currently provided as a lifelong benefit stream, though some 
workers would be willing to trade a portion of their annuity streams in exchange for a lump 
sum amount. This paper explores whether allowing people to receive a lump sum as a 
payment for delayed retirement rather than as an addition to their lifetime Social Security 
benefits might induce them to work longer. We model the factors that influence how people 
trade off a Social Security stream for a lump sum, and we also examine the consequences of 
such tradeoffs for work, retirement, and life cycle wellbeing. Our base case indicates that 
workers given the chance to receive their delayed retirement credit as a lump sum payment 
would boost their average retirement age by 1.5-2 years. This will interest policymakers 
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Exchanging Delayed Social Security Benefits for Lump Sums: 
Could This Incentivize Longer Work Careers? 
 
Jingjing Chai, Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Ralph Rogalla 
 
 
 
Deciding when to retire and claim Social Security benefits is one of the most 
important financial decisions that people make. Traditionally, claiming triggers the beginning 
of a lifelong annuity payment. Yet if workers who delayed claiming were offered a lump sum 
instead of an actuarially-adjusted deferred annuity, it is possible that at least some would 
decide to work longer. This paper models the factors that influence whether individuals would 
be willing to trade off delayed Social Security benefits in exchange for a lump sum. 
Additionally, we examine the consequences of providing a lump sum reward in lieu of an 
actuarially-adjusted annuity for work, retirement, and life cycle wellbeing.    
Economic theory suggests that retirees value lifelong income benefit streams that 
protect them from running out of money in old age (Yaari 1965; Davidoff et al. 2005; 
Mitchell et al. 1999). An implication of the theory is that most risk-averse individuals would 
be expected to hold a substantial portion of their portfolios in annuitized assets. Nevertheless, 
empirical evidence suggests that many people value lump sum payouts over lifelong benefit 
streams (Brown et al. 2008; Warner and Pleeter 2001). We explore these key outcomes by 
developing and implementing a realistically-calibrated life cycle model for forward looking 
rational agents with endogenous labor supply, saving, investment, and retirement decisions, 
that allows for time-varying investment opportunity sets and risky labor income.  
The goal of this research is to evaluate whether this potential approach to Social 
Security reform would induce workers to retire later on a voluntary basis.  We find that such a 
policy has the potential to increase retirement ages substantially, with little or no decline in 
welfare. Three factors help explain why the lump sum reward for deferred retirement can 
induce more work while not decreasing lifetime utility. First, many people would prefer to 
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have a lump sum rather than an addition to their lifetime Social Security benefit, as this 
affords them flexibility over the timing of their consumption and leisure decisions. A second 
reason is liquidity driven: that is, if people desire to leave a stock of assets to their heirs, 
having a lump sum enhances this possibility. And third, financially sophisticated individuals 
able to participate in the equity market will find attractive the opportunity to invest some of 
their lump sum amounts. 
  Policymakers seeking ways to reform the Social Security system may be interested in 
our findings, since the actuarially fair lump sum for delayed retirement does induce some 
individuals to work longer voluntarily. In our base case, workers given the chance to receive 
their delayed retirement credit as a lump sum payment would boost their average retirement 
age by 1.5-2 years. Moreover, when the reform is implemented, this boosts the probability of 
working beyond the normal retirement age from 29% to 86% for the young, and from 4% to 
49% for 60-year olds.  Results vary, of course, across individuals of different types: the effect 
is even larger for less risk-averse older households, while the most risk-averse respond least. 
Financially unsophisticated households (i.e. those who lack access to the equity market) are 
also relatively unresponsive to the lump sum option; even here, though, the less risk-averse 
still tend to work longer and retire later. Moreover, we show that such a lump sum policy 
would generally not detract from wellbeing: in the base case, young workers typically have 
virtually no change in lifetime utility, whereas older individuals gain slightly. Among the less 
financially sophisticated, both the young and the old experience little change.  
  It is worth noting that offering a lump sum equivalent in expected present value to the 
delayed retirement credit would be cost-neutral to the system, on average. Additionally, if 
older individuals worked longer voluntarily, this could enhance system solvency via 
additional payroll tax collections. 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
Prior Studies  
This paper contributes to the research examining the effects of Social Security policies 
on labor supply.1 A number of studies in the portfolio choice literature have investigated how 
individuals might alter their work, investment, annuitization, and retirement decisions in 
response to change in Social Security benefits assuming a parameterization similar to that in 
the US Social Security system.2 Yet these analyses have not examined optimal household life 
cycle behavior with flexible work hours and retirement, to assess what might happen if people 
were afforded the opportunity to take part of their Social Security benefits as a lump sum 
instead of as a benefit flow.  
  Experimental research and survey evidence has suggested that a majority of workers 
would favor lump-sum payments over lifetime benefits, if these were approximately 
actuarially equivalent. Furthermore, there is some modest price sensitivity associated with this 
preference (Brown et al. 2008, 2011). Orszag (2001) discussed some important institutional 
design aspects of Social Security (e.g. computation of present values, spousal/widow benefits) 
and offered comments on how lump sum benefits might replace the delayed retirement 
(annuity) credit. His work provided some preliminary evidence that claiming probabilities 
could rise in response. Fetherstonhaugh and Ross (1999) reported that for 80 percent of their 
survey respondents, a lump-sum payment instead of an increase in annual benefit amounts 
due to delayed claiming would provide an incentive to claim later. Nevertheless, those studies 
focus specifically on the claiming decision (and how these decisions are framed), but they 
abstract from other important factors including preferences (risk aversion, leisure, 
impatience), the state of the business cycle, uncertainty with respect to labor income and 
capital markets, asset allocation, household saving, and health status. Most importantly, they 
assume that the claiming decision is independent of labor force participation. Therefore that 
                                                 
1 See Feldstein and Leibman (2002) for a review, and most recently, Laitner and Silverman (2012). 
2 See Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008), Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011) and Chai, Maurer, Mitchell, and 
Rogalla (2012). 
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research is silent on the likely impact of such lump-sum options on work hours, retirement 
ages, saving, and household wellbeing. Moreover, offering such lump-sums could potentially 
induce workers to delay retirement and claiming of Social Security benefits, which could 
enhance system sustainability. There has been no theoretical research on this topic to date. 
 
Methodology  
Our prior work on which we build this study developed, implemented, and calibrated a  
realistic discrete time life cycle model of endogenous work hours, retirement behavior, 
consumption, saving, and portfolio choice (c.f. Chai, Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla 2012). 
Allowing for uninsurable labor income risk and capital market risk, this model incorporates 
individual risk aversion, time preferences, and leisure preferences, as well as borrowing 
constraint, and uncertain length of life. Preferences in each period are characterized by an iso-
elastic and time-separable power utility function defined over a composite good consisting of 
consumption Ct and leisure Lt at time t, and wealth Qt bequeathed to the next generation.  
As is conventional in the theoretical literature, the relative importance of leisure and 
consumption is valued using a modified Cobb-Douglas function, which ensures that the 
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is equal to one. The value function 
is given by: 
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the subjective probability of surviving to time t + 1, given the consumer is alive at t. The 
parameter is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and  is the rate of time preference. 
Leisure preferences are governed by the parameter α. The strength of the bequest motive is 
controlled by the parameter b. In each period, the individual must decide how much to work, 
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consume, and invest in the capital market. Also the worker must decide when to retire and 
claim Social Security benefits. This problem is solved through backward induction of the 
value function. The optimal policies are then evaluated by conducting a Monte Carlo 
simulation (for further details see Appendix A). For the base case worker, preference 
parameters are set as follows: coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ = 5, discount factor β = 
0.97, leisure preference value  = 1.3, and bequest strength b = 0. The one-period survival 
rates tp  are taken from the US 2000 population mortality table for females.
3 In additional 
sensitivity analysis we vary preference parameters. 
The stock and labor market processes are governed by a “regime-switching” process 
for the business cycle. Asset returns are characterized by either a ‘normal’ capital market 
(with low volatility/high expected returns) or a ‘crisis’ scenario (with high volatility/low 
expected returns). The deterministic component of the wage rate process and the labor income 
shock process follows Chai, Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2012). Housing-related 
expenditures are estimated using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (as described in 
Appendix B). 
  We also implement a realistic approach to determining Social Security benefits, where 
the worker may claim a benefit between the early retirement age (ERA) of 62 and the late 
retirement age (LRA) of 70. If the worker claims prior to her normal retirement age (NRA), 
she receives a permanently lower benefit for life; if she claims later, her Social Security 
benefit payment is increased by the delayed retirement credit. For our alternative scenario, we 
examine how retirement behavior would change if the individual could take a part of her 
Social Security benefits as a lump sum payment, by working beyond the NRA. This lump 
sum payment would be equal, in present value terms, to the additional benefit stream paid to 
the worker claiming Social Security benefits after the NRA.   
                                                 
3 Using a similar model framework; Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011) show that these parameter 
values replicate several empirical facts including the hump-shaped pattern of work hours, the two peaks in 
retirement rates, and the sizeable decline in consumption at retirement. 
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  Several factors might be anticipated to lead people to favor a lump sum over an 
annuity stream. For instance, people might wish to leave a bequest, have a higher or lower 
discount rate, value leisure strongly, or be very risk-averse. Other influences could include 
changes in the retirement system such as a lower replacement rate and a higher normal 
retirement age. We also explore how financial sophistication might shape peoples’ responses 
to the Social Security lump sum option versus the annuity. This takes into account the finding 
that many Americans lack knowledge of and easy access to sophisticated financial 
instruments such as equities (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007; Gomes and Michaelides 2005).4 
Additionally we provide a welfare analysis which evaluates the extent to which the ability to 
convert deferred Social Security benefits into a lump sum can enhance worker wellbeing.  
  In what follows, we present results for individuals initially observed at age 20, and 
separately at age 60. This allows us to explore the likely behavioral responses of older versus 
younger workers. We present two sets of results: in the base case, workers have access to the 
stock and the bond market, which we deem the financially sophisticated group. In an 
alternative scenario, the analysis assumes that individuals can hold only bonds paying a safe 
return, but they have no access to equities. The model assumes that 20-year olds hold no 
initial wealth. For 60-year olds, we estimate distributions of income and wealth-to-income 
ratios using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for single female households.5 To this 
end, we first group all households initially aged 60 into two categories: stockholders and non-
stockholders. Then, within each household category, we drop the lower and upper labor 
income quartiles (to avoid data outliers). Hence, there are 50 labor income percentiles left (i.e. 
the 25th -74th percentile).6 In order to specify distinct combinations of wealth-to-income ratios 
                                                 
4 Using a dataset on Swedish investors, Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009) find empirical evidence that the 
share of risky assets held by households is strongly positively correlated with an index for financial 
sophistication.  
5 The HRS (here we use waves one to ten) is a longitudinal panel study which surveys a representative sample of 
over 26,000 respondents age 50+ every two years; see http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/. 
6 This procedure generates wealth-to-income-ratios for stockholders (non-stockholders) with a mean value of 
3.76 (1.31), and a standard-deviation of 1.7 (0.75).  
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and labor income percentiles, we estimate average wealth-to-income ratios for each of the 50 
income percentiles. We then simulate 10,000 life cycle paths for every combination of wealth-
to-income ratios and income quantiles using optimal feedback controls obtained from the 
numerical optimization model. All results are reported as the average of 50,000 paths (i.e. 
50ൈ10,000). 
 
Results 
  Under the Social Security system’s current rules, a worker who delays claiming her 
benefit until after the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) is entitled to a benefit increase of about 
8% per year that retirement is deferred.7 In our model, under an actuarially fair lump sum 
scheme, an individual who opted to work to age 66 instead of claiming benefits at age 65 
would then receive a lump sum worth of about 1.2 times her age-65 benefit, plus the age-65 
benefit stream for life. Similarly, an individual deferring retirement even later, to age 70, 
would receive a lump sum worth about 6 times the starting-age annual benefit payment, plus 
the age-65 benefit stream for life (see Appendix A for details). 
Results for the Base Case 
  To illustrate how our life cycle model works, we refer to the base case results in 
Figure 1. Average consumption increases with age in the top panel, since workers are not able 
to borrow against future labor income. Consistent with empirical evidence,8 consumption 
drops sharply around the retirement age and continues to decrease thereafter. The model also 
generates a relatively realistic work hours profile by age, as reported in the second panel. 
                                                 
7 The Social Security delayed retirement credit of 8% per year’s delay was intended to be actuarially fair at the 
time the law was passed; this was consistent with average mortality tables at the time, as well as a 2.9% real 
assumed interest rate. In this paper we assume a real interest rate of 2%, a rate more consistent with the current 
low interest rate regime. As Shoven and Slavov (2012) note, in such a case the delayed retirement credit of 8% 
per annum will be better than actuarially fair for most people, thus embodying additional incentives to defer 
retirement. To the extent this is true, the lump sums we compute are also better than actuarially fair with respect 
to the 2.9% assumption. 
8 See Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg (2001), Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998), Battistin, Brugiavini, and 
Weber (2009), and the discussion in Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011).  
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Younger workers in their 20’s and 30’s work more than 40 hours per week. Individuals in 
their 40’s (50’s) devote about 40 (35) hours per week to their jobs; after that, they sharply cut 
back on average work hours and start to retire from full-time employment. 9 The third panel 
reports asset allocation patterns by age. For those age 20-30, the bond fraction is 60%, 
somewhat higher than found in empirical work. Yet from their 30’s onward, individuals hold 
about 30-40% of their wealth in bonds, and 60-70% in stocks; these ratios are in line with 
empirical evidence.10 Overall, our life cycle model is able to generate consumption, work, and 
investment patterns that accord reasonably well with empirical evidence. 
Figure 1 here 
  Next we examine how the two different delayed retirement schemes affect results in 
the base case for individuals initially age 20 (left side of Figure 1) versus age 60 (right side). 
Offering a lump sum Social Security instead of a larger benefit payment for deferred 
retirement changes life cycle consumption, work hours, and investment patterns. For the 
younger group, consumption and work hours do not respond much until they reach their 60’s. 
At that point, those who will receive the lump sum can consume more and enjoy less leisure. 
This occurs because the lump sum can spent as well as invested, potentially earning a market 
return that permits more spending. Additionally, this higher consumption is traded off for less 
leisure at older ages (more work hours). Overall, asset allocation under the two scenarios is 
also quite similar, though after age 60, having the lump sum leads to a slightly higher equity 
exposure and hence slightly lower bond fraction. Similarly, for those age 60 when the lump 
sum is introduced, consumption and work hours increase, while bond holdings fall slightly.  
  Additional detail on retirement patterns is provided in Table 1, where young people – 
knowing they will receive a lump sum for deferred retirement – shift rather markedly toward 
later retirement. In fact, the left panel indicates that the average retirement age rises by 1.8 
                                                 
9 For more on this point see Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011).  
10 See for example Gomes and Michaelides (2005).  
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years (from 64.5 to 66.3); the probability of claiming benefits after the NRA rises from 29% 
to 86%. Among those already age 60 when the lump sum scenario is implemented (right 
panel), the average retirement age again rises though by a bit less, 1.4 years (from 63.5 to 
64.9).  While most older workers do claim benefits by age 68, their probability of working 
beyond the NRA rises substantially, from 4% to 49%.11 
Table 1 here 
Sensitivity Analysis 
  Thus far, results for the base case provide support for the conclusion that providing a 
lump sum instead of an increased annuity benefit for deferred retirement under Social 
Security would induce people to work longer.  Next, in sensitivity analyses presented in Table 
2, we explore what happens when key preference parameters are changed. In addition, we 
analyze the impact of two other potential changes in the Social Security rules, reported in 
Panel A. Finally, Panel B illustrates the policy impacts on households who do not access the 
equity market.  
Table 2 here 
  Several alternative calibrations for preference parameters are provided in Table 2, to 
be compared with the average retirement age results for the base case as well as the estimated 
probability of working beyond the normal retirement age. Interestingly, workers with a 
moderate versus a strong bequest motive (b = 2 or 5 in Panel A), compared to the base case 
without bequests, behave relatively similarly when given a lump sum instead of a delayed 
retirement annuity. Thus young workers seeking to leave a bequest would defer retirement by 
1.9 years, on average, versus 1.8 if they had no interest in bequests; the older group would 
boost its retirement age by 1.3 years versus 1.4 with no bequest motive. It is also worth noting 
                                                 
11 Table 1 shows two spikes in retirement frequency, at ages 63 and 66 (for the group initially age 20). These are 
slightly later than the two retirement peaks at age 62 and 65 reported by Gustman and Steinmeier (2005). Yet 
that study denotes people as retired if they leave full-time work, while we assume that individuals claim 
retirement benefits and move to full leisure at the same age. If we define retirement as working less than 20 
hours per week, this would shift retirement rates earlier.         
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that the probabilities of working beyond the NRA are comparable across the board. In sum, 
even when workers have a bequest motive, the delayed retirement impact of the reform is 
similar. Accordingly, providing a lump sum does not simply result in wealth transfers to one’s 
heirs, consistent with the rationale for Social Security as a national social insurance scheme 
intended to support consumption for the elderly.   
  The next six rows of Panel A in Table 2 illustrate how results change for lower/higher 
subjective discount rates, lower/higher risk aversion, and lower/higher levels of tastes for 
leisure versus consumption.  Less patient younger and older workers (ߚ ൌ 0.96) will chose to 
retire earlier as compared to the base case, but the lump sum reform still induces more to 
work beyond the normal retirement age, and on average retirement ages rise. As discount 
rates fall, those who are more patient (ߚ ൌ 0.99) will work longer than in the base case, with 
an average increase of over one year in the retirement age; here too, the lump sum induces 
later retirement. Turning next to differences by level of risk tolerance, older workers who are 
not particularly risk averse (ߩ ൌ 2) will retire at the same age as in the base case. Yet offering 
them the lump sum instead of the delayed annuity credit produces a much larger impact on 
retirement ages: on average, the retirement age rises by 3.3 years compared to 1.3 in the base 
case. A young household with low risk aversion retires 1.8 years earlier on average than the 
base case household but delays retirement by a comparable 1.6 years in the lump sum regime. 
Early retirement is also the norm for the extraordinarily risk averse (ߩ ൌ 8), under any of the 
circumstances depicted. This is because such individuals tend to work very hard and save a 
great deal at younger ages to protect against shocks; then, as they approach their 60’s, they 
favor certain leisure and early retirement instead of worrying about not being able to consume 
due to uncertain mortality. Additionally, offering them a lump sum has hardly any effect on 
retirement behavior.  
  Next we turn to two alternative formulations for leisure preferences: one individual 
11 
 
 
 
values consumption much more highly ( = 0.7) than in the base case, and the other values 
leisure more ( = 1.9). Here, the lump sum reform has virtually no impact. That is, leisure 
lovers still quit work early, and those who strongly prefer consumption still retire later since 
longer worklives generate more spendable income.   
  The final two rows of Panel A in Table 2 examine the impact of two variations on 
Social Security system parameters. Not surprisingly, if the Social Security benefit 
replacement rate were reduced from λ = 60% to 45%, retirement ages rise substantially.  
Those who have a lifetime to adjust, who are initially age 20, work 2.7 years longer, and the 
older group works 3.3 more years. In both instances the probability of working over the NRA 
exceeds 90%. This result obtains regardless of whether the delayed retirement credit is 
replaced by the lump sum.  In our second policy variant, we raise the NRA from 65 to 67 for 
those initially age 20. This again would raise the average retirement age in the annuity regime, 
but moving to the lump sum scenario would have hardly any additional impact on retirement 
behavior.  
  If the aim is to raise retirement ages, the last two policies work in the same direction as 
replacing the delayed retirement credit with a lump sum as described above. Yet cutting the 
replacement rate and raising the NRA will be politically unpopular, since these represent 
benefit reductions; offering the lump sum does not represent a benefit cut but a rather a 
change in the timing of benefit receipt.  
  To this point, we have assumed that consumers have access to the equity market if 
they wish to allocate their portfolios across risky and risk-free assets. Panel B illustrates 
results if consumers do not access the equity market. This might be the case for people who 
are not financially savvy due to lack of time, information, or the requisite guidance on how to 
buy stock. We call this group the financially unsophisticated, consistent with van Rooij, 
Lusardi and Alessie (2011) who show that those who lack financial literacy do not invest in 
12 
 
 
 
the stock market. It is well known that some 50% of households do not participate in the stock 
market today (SCF, 2012; Gomes and Michaelides, 2005); hence for this group, this second 
set of results could be relevant.   
  Once again, we evaluate how retirement ages would change if the lump sum were 
offered in lieu of the Social Security delayed benefit. The first row indicates that, in the base 
case, both the young and the old would retire later than in Panel A.  But giving workers a 
lump sum for deferred retirement instead of an increased annuity would be less effective in 
inducing prolonged work at older ages. 
  The second row of Panel B indicates that people who love risk (ߩ ൌ 2) worry less 
about smoothing consumption, so for them the lump sum induces longer work and higher 
consumption. By contrast, for extremely risk averse younger individuals (ߩ ൌ 8), the reform 
has again the opposite incentive: they retire earlier and have a much lower probability of 
working beyond the Normal Retirement Age. This can be explained by the fact that the 
financially unsophisticated place a high value on the Social Security annuity as it allows them 
to smooth consumption and also protects against longevity risk. These individuals cannot 
replicate the benefit stream by investing the lump sum in the bond market. Evidently, 
boosting Americans’ level of financial literacy would help strengthen the incentive effects of 
a lump sum reform.    
 
Welfare Implications  
  Finally we turn to an analysis of the welfare implications of replacing the delayed 
retirement benefit with a lump sum. The approach evaluates how much additional wealth (as a 
percent of first-year labor earnings) the individual would need under the current regime, to be 
as well off as under the lump sum regime. Accordingly, a positive value implies the reform is 
welfare enhancing, while a negative value implies the opposite.   
  Table 3 reports the results for various parameterizations of people initially age 20 and 
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age 60 when the reform is implemented. In the base case, the change in welfare for the young 
is miniscule (10 basis points). For those age 60 when the reform is implemented, the change 
in lifetime utility is valued slightly positively, at 4%. Under alternative preference settings, 
there is virtually no impact on the young – the welfare changes in all cases do not exceed -1%. 
Moreover, the young financially unsophisticated also experience almost no change in utility, 
with the exception of the very risk averse, where lifetime welfare declines by 10% of the 
initial labor income.  
Table 3 here 
  Turning to the older group (initially age 60), welfare impacts are all positive but 
relatively small (below 5%) in most cases. One exception is for the risk-lover ( = 2) who has 
access to the stock market. Here, the consumer’s welfare gains amount to a substantial 29%, 
because she can trade off higher consumption levels early in retirement in exchange for lower 
consumption later (when mortality risk increases). Moreover she has access to the equity 
market and can invest part (or all) of the lump sum. The welfare gain is much lower (18%) 
when the worker does not invest in the equity market.  
  For two groups of older individuals, welfare rises under the lump sum regime, but 
there is little impact on retirement (see Table 2). Those with little taste for leisure ( = 0.7) 
appreciate the lump sum but do not change work patterns as compared to the annuity regime; 
this is because they are already willing to work a long time (up to age 70, in some cases) to 
finance their high consumption needs. Their lengthy worklives generate high lump sum 
payments for the delayed retirement credit, which in turn can be invested in the stock market 
and used to boost consumption. The welfare gains of a lump sum payment compared to higher 
annuity benefits disappears for 60-year old work lovers ( = 0.7) with no access to the stock 
market.12 
                                                 
12 Such preferences for very long worklife may not be relevant for the broader population, but they would apply 
to tenured university professors (Ashenfelter and Card, 2002). 
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  The retiree with a less generous replacement ratio (λ = 0.45) profits by receiving the 
delayed retirement credit as a lump sum instead of a higher lifelong pension (welfare rises by 
22.3%). Again, the reform has little impact on work effort, because in both cases the retiree is 
willing to work longer to compensate the lower replacement rate. Rather the welfare 
improvement results again from the possibility to invest the lump sum in the stock market.13  
 In general, the lump sum reform offers an incentive for people to trade off more 
consumption for less leisure, by working longer and deferring retirement. Overall, this reform 
has little impact on the young, relatively speaking, and it slightly enhances welfare among the 
older population. Accordingly, such a reform could be an appealing alternative to encourage 
longer worklives. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has explored whether people might voluntarily work longer if they were 
offered a lump sum instead of a delayed retirement annuity under Social Security. We adopt a 
realistically calibrated life cycle model with forward looking rational agents with endogenous 
labor supply, saving, investment, and retirement decisions, and allowing for time-varying 
investment opportunity sets and risky labor income. This model generates consumption, work, 
and investment profiles, relatively consistent with empirical evidence. 
We show theoretically that substituting a lump sum for the delayed Social Security 
annuity provides an incentive for many workers to voluntarily defer retirement, with little 
reduction in lifetime welfare. In other words, giving workers a lump sum at their delayed 
retirement date permits them to adjust the timing of their consumption and leisure time to 
adapt their preferences. People who receive their delayed retirement credit as a lump sum 
payment should optimally boost their average retirement age by 1.5-2 years. Having a lump 
sum in lieu of a higher lifetime Social Security benefit allows retirees to shift consumption to 
                                                 
13 For consumers lacking access to the stock market, the welfare gain is positive but small (less than 2%). 
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the earlier phase of retirement when mortality risk is low. In addition, the lump sum payment 
permits households to participate in the stock market, seeking to earn the risk premium. These 
results hold whether or not workers have a positive bequest motive, implying that the lump 
sum does not simply result in wealth transfers to theirs.  Households without access to the 
equity market are less responsive to the lump sum option, but even here, the less risk-averse 
also work longer and retire later, and the lump sum policy generally does not detract from 
wellbeing.   
In years to come, US policymakers will be actively seeking ways to reform Social 
Security to restore the system to solvency. Proposing cuts in benefits tends to be quite 
politically difficult. By contrast, offering a fair lump sum in place of the delayed retirement 
annuity credit may be more politically attractive.  By (voluntarily) delaying their retirement 
date due to the lump sum option, workers would continue to pay Social Security payroll taxes 
for more years, which could help return the system to solvency via additional payroll tax 
collections. Moreover, such a policy could be designed to be cost-neutral, albeit in the real 
world one would also need to consider additional issues including spouse and survivor 
benefits, changes in annuity factors, sudden demands for liquidity due to health shocks, and 
other factors. These are all avenues of future research.   
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Appendix A: The Life Cycle Model 
   We build on the framework developed and calibrated by Chai, Maurer, Mitchell, and 
Rogalla (2012). Stock returns and labor earnings are driven by a Markov-Regime-Switching 
process for the business cycle with two states: normal (st = 0), or contraction (st = 1). The 
consumer observes the current state and knows the (constant) conditional transition probabilities
)|P(: 1, isjs tt
BC
ji    to be at time t+1 in state j, given that at time t the economy is in state i. 
Using US Gross National Product data, we estimate the transition probabilities between the two 
states as 68.00,00,0  BCBC  and 32.00,00,0  BCBC  .14 Capital markets include riskless bonds with 
gross return Rf = 1.02 and risky stocks. Log stock returns ),(~)ln( 1, iits NR   are normally 
distributed with state dependent parameters by either being in a normal capital market regime 
with low volatility (σ0 = 11.21 percent) and high expected returns (µ0 = 6.84 percent), or a 
contraction regime with high volatility (σ1 = 20.77 percent) and low expected returns (µ1 = 2.12 
percent). Income on assets is taxed according to the proportional rate ,c  which we set to 20 
percent. 
 The labor income process allows for unemployment risk and state-dependent wage rate 
dynamics. The individual receives uncertain labor income depending on what fraction of 
available time is devoted to work (1 - Lt) and a state dependent wage rate 1, tstWR . Earnings from 
the labor market are reduced by an age-dependent fraction qt+1 of housing related expenditures, 
estimated using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (or CES) as shown in Appendix B. 
In addition, the worker must pay income taxes according to a proportional tax rate l equal to 30 
percent. Thus disposable yearly labor earnings before the (endogenous) retirement age (t < τ,
]70,...,63,62[ ) are given by: 
  
                                                 
14 As in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) a contraction (expansion) state occurs when the GNP growth rate 
was less than (greater than) its sample period mean. 
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     ttsltEts LWRqY   11)1( 1,11,   (A-1) 
 Here Lt = [1/3, 1] stands for leisure and is measured as a percentage of available time. To 
transfer normalized leisure into work hours we assume 100 waking hours per week. The 
exogenously- determined wage rate process is given by   .exp 11,11,   ttstts UEwWR  The 
deterministic trend component 1tw  is calibrated using the earnings function reported in Fehr, 
Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2006) for middle-income workers,15 and it is scaled to generate an 
average gross labor income of $20,000 at age 20. ),0(~)ln( 1 ut NU   is a state-independent 
transitory shock ( u = 32.9 percent), 16 and 1,,1,   tststs nEE  is a state-dependent permanent labor 
earnings component, with ).,0(~)ln( ,1, snts Nn  We follow Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron 
(2004) and set the state dependent volatility sn, of permanent wage rates shocks in the normal 
state to 0,n 8.4 percent which is lower than in the contraction scenario 1,n 15.9 percent. 
The correlation between stock returns and permanent and transitory earnings shocks  for both 
cases is set to 0.2. 
 The worker could be unemployed in the next period, where the state-dependent 
probability of unemployment Us is again lower in the normal state ( U0 = 5 percent) than in the 
contraction state ( U1 = 10 percent). In such a situation, the worker receives unemployment 
compensation at time t + 1 specified as a set fraction of labor income, i.e., .6.0 1,1,
E
ts
U
ts YY    
 The model allows a flexible retirement age, i.e. the worker can claim a Social Security 
benefit payable for life at any age between the early retirement age (ERA = 62) and the latest 
retirement age (LRA = 70). Once benefits are claimed, the individual does not return to the 
workforce. If the worker claims prior to the normal retirement age (NRA = 65), the benefits are 
                                                 
15 Precisely we use equation (9) with parameter =0 which produces a humped shaped trend function for wages 
rates: w(age)=exp(4.47+0.033*age–0.00067*age2). 
16 The volatility of the transitory shock is estimated by averaging the fixed effect and measurement error from 
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004).  
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permanently reduced for each year of early retirement according to the reduction factor g1 = 
0.0713. If the individual works longer than the NRA, the Social Security benefit is increased per 
year of additional work by the delayed retirement credit g2 = 0.077 (see Buchinsky, Rust, and 
Benitez-Silva 2000). To capture this feature, we calculate the after-tax Social Security benefits as 
in Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011): 
    NRArtt FYqY ,1)1(  ,  (A-2) 
where is ܨఛ,ேோ஺ ൌ exp൫െ݃ଵሺܴܰܣ െ ߬ሻ൯ ∙ ܫሼఛஸேோ஺ሽ ൅ exp൫െ݃ଶሺܴܰܣ െ ߬ሻ൯ ∙ ܫሼఛவேோ஺ሽ a factor 
which specifies the reduction/increase of retirement benefits if the individual retires prior/later to 
the NRA. The parameter λ is the Social Security replacement rate (here set to 60 percent as in 
Mitchell and Phillips 2006) based on the worker’s lifetime average earnings approximated by  
തܻ ൌ ൫∑ ሺ1 െ ܮതሻ exp൫ݓሺݐሻ൯/ܭ௄௧ୀଵ ൯ ∙ ܧ௄. Here K denotes when the individual attains the normal 
retirement age (NRA) and 1 െ ܮത stands for the average working time until retirement, which we 
set equal to 0.4 corresponding to a lifetime work effort of 40 hours per week on average. As in 
Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008) Social Security benefits are taxed at a proportional rate of 
r 15 percent. 
 Alternatively, we posit that the individual can receive the delayed Social Security 
retirement benefit as a lump sum payment, instead of an increase in lifelong annuity benefits. In 
this case, the lump sum payment is calculated as the actuarial present value of the additional 
annuity benefits generated by working longer than the normal retirement age. Formally the lump 
sum payment is given (t > NRA) as follows: 
  
tNRA
r
t äFYLS  )1()1( ,
  (A-3)
 
Here ሷܽ ௧ ൌ 1 ൅ ∑ ሺ∏ ݌௨௧ା௠ିଵ௨ୀ௧ ሻ்ିଵ௠ୀଵ ∙ ௙ܴି ௠	is the actuarial present value factor based on the 
riskless interest rate Rf and the one year survival probabilities pt (i.e. to survive to time t+1 given 
being alive at t).  
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 The following table illustrates the possible lump sum payments for delaying retirement as 
percentage of benefits at age 65 (ceteribus paribus). To calculate them, we use a riskless interest 
rate of 2% per annum (as in our life cycle model) and the US 2000 population mortality table for 
females. Further we normalize the lump sum payments given in equation (A-3) by  Yr )1(  . In 
addition we report the delayed retirement credits NRAF ,  if the worker receives the additional 
benefits as a lifelong annuity. 
 Retirement Age 
 66 67 68 69 70 
      
Life Annuity (in % of NRA benefit) 8.0 16.6 26.0 36.1 46.9 
Lump Sum (in % of NRA benefit) 119.0 239.2 360.0 481.1 602.9 
 
 Each period, the consumer decides how much to work (1 - Lt) to generate labor income, 
when to retire, and how to allocate cash on hand Wt to bonds Bt, stocks St, and consumption Ct. 
The budget constraint is given by: 
  tttt CBSW  , (A-4) 
and next period’s wealth Wt+1 is described by: 
  1,1,1 )()1)((   tsttccfttstt YSBRBRSW 
      
 
 
(A-5) 
Here, Ys,t is labor income as defined in equations (A-1) and (A-2). This is the state-dependent net 
labor income (or unemployment benefits) prior to claiming and the Social Security benefits after 
claiming. In case the household claims after the NRA, the delayed retirement credit is paid in 
form of a lump sum, and ݃ଶ in equation (A-2) is set to zero when calculating the lifelong benefits 
from Social Security. In this situation, the wealth transition equation at the time of claiming, ݐ̅, is 
given by:  
  11,1,1 )()1)((   ttstt
cc
fttstt LSYSBRBRSW 
      
  
 
(A-6) 
Here LSt is the lump sum payment according to equation (A-3) the household receives at time 
ݐ̅ ൅ 1. In subsequent periods (ݐ ൐ ݐ̅), the transition equation is again given by (A-5).  
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 Households cannot borrow against human capital nor can they hold short positions in 
stocks and bonds (Ct, St, Bt, ≥ 0). Moreover, we posit that in order to participate in the stock 
market, the household has to be willing and able to invest a minimum amount in stocks (as in 
Smetters and Chen, 2010). This amount is set to 50% of permanent labor income. 
 The individual’s optimization problem is now to maximize lifetime utility with respect to 
her asset allocation between bonds and stocks, consumption, work hours, and the retirement 
decision. After normalizing with permanent labor income there are four state variables: cash on 
hand Wt, retirement age τ, the business cycle state s, and age t. We discretize the (normalized) 
continuous state variable and solve the optimization problem by backward induction. For 
computations, we use a grid of dimension 40(W) × 2(s) × 42(t) before and 40(W) × 2(s) × 39(t) 
× 9() after the ERA. For each grid point we evaluate the policy and value functions using 
Gaussian quadrature integration and cubic-splines interpolation. 
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Appendix B. Construction of Housing-related Expenditure to Income Ratios 
 The Consumer Expenditure Survey (or CES) is collected by the U.S. Federal 
government through the Bureau of Labor Statistics, for the purpose of providing a complete 
range of information on consumer expenditures and income.  The survey consists of five 
interviews on a quarterly basis. At the initial interview, each household must complete a 
consumption diary over a 2-week span and provide a detailed overview of what it consumes 
on a daily basis. The subsequent four interviews focus on quarterly expenditures and annual 
income; expenditures on housing in the current quarter we multiply by four to obtain annual 
housing expenditures. Our dataset spans the time period 1996 to 2010 and represents a panel 
over one-period horizons, but different households are interviewed on a year-to-year basis. In 
total, there were 425,672 interviews of 145,203 unique households over the 15-year period. 
We consider only households where the head is between ages 20-89; we omit observations 
with negative housing expenditures or labor income. In addition, any observation with a 
housing-expenditure-to-labor-income ratio exceeding one is excluded from the analysis. This 
leaves 116,015 households and 161,050 yearly observations.  
 The variables of interest relate to housing expenditures and labor income to generate a 
ratio of ‘Housing Expenditure over Labor Income.’ We sought to fit this measure as closely 
as possible to the specification reported in Gomes and Michaelides (2005). We define annual 
labor income as FINCBTAX-(INTEARNX+FININCX), described as ‘Income before taxes’ 
less ‘income from savings and bonds’ and ‘income from dividends, royalties, etc.’17 
Quarterly housing expenditures are estimated as the sum of the variables HOUSCQ  and 
HOUSPQ, and this we multiply by four to obtain annual housing expenditures. The last 
pertinent variable for analysis is the age of the reference person, which is AGE.   
                                                 
17 One might ask why we do not use the income after taxes (FINCATAX). We discovered that, for some 
households reporting an income of zero (FINCBTAX=0), they still had to pay some taxes so the after-tax income 
was negative. This poses a problem for computing the ratio of Housing Expenditures to Labor Income. 
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 Next we run a regression of the ratio of housing expenditures to labor income (qi,t) on 
age polynomials and an economy dummy. The ratios are computed for each household by 
taking housing expenditures (mortgage/rent payments, utilities, and housing-related durable 
expenditures) relative to the before-tax labor income and regressed against a cubic 
polynomial of age (of the head of the household), and a dummy variable representing an 
economy that is either normal (=0) or contracting (=1).  The regression is as follows:   
ݍ௜௧ ൌ ܿ݋݊ݏݐܽ݊ݐ ൅ ܤଵ ∗ ܽ݃݁ ൅ ܤଶ ∗ ܽ݃݁ଶ ൅ ܤଷ ∗ ܽ݃݁ଷ ൅ ܤସ ∗ ݁ܿ݋݊݋݉ݕ ൅ ߝ௜௧  
Results of this regression analysis are summarized in the following table: 
 
  Coefficient t‐Statistic Standard Errors 
Constant  0.5773585 49.51 0.011661 
Age  ‐0.0132081  ‐17.57  0.000752 
Age2  0.0001793  11.83  0.000015 
Age3  ‐5.72E‐07 ‐5.97 0.000000 
Economy  0.0016453  1.61  0.001022 
   
No. of Observations  161,050 
R‐Squared  0.021 
 
 
Our results are compatible with observed rates of higher housing spending especially at older 
ages, unlike Gomes and Michaelides (2005) who assume that housing expenditures are zero 
over age 80.   
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Figure 1: Impact of Lump Sum vs. Annuity Reward for Delayed Retirement on 
Consumption, Work Hours, and Investments among the Financially Sophisticated 
 
 Age 20 Age 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Expected life cycle profiles for financially sophisticated households with access to the 
stock market. Annuity: Delayed retirement benefits are paid as a lifelong increase of the 
pension annuity. Lump Sum: Delayed retirement benefits are paid as an actuarially fair one-
time lump sum at retirement. Consumption at various ages reported in USD thousands. Work 
hours and bond fraction reported as average for different age groups. Base case calibration: 
relative risk aversion ߩ ൌ 5, bequest motive strength ܾ ൌ 0, time preference ߚ ൌ 0.97, leisure 
preference ߙ ൌ 1.3, normal retirement age ܴܰܣ ൌ 65, early retirement age ܧܴܣ ൌ 62, latest 
retirement age ܮܴܣ ൌ 70, Social Security replacement rate ߣ ൌ 0.6. Source: Authors’ 
calculations. 
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Table 1: Impact of Lump Sum vs. Annuity Reward for Delayed Retirement on 
Retirement Age: Base Case 
Age 20 Age 60 
Age  Annuity Lump Sum Annuity Lump Sum 
62  1.7 1.0 14.7 8.1 
63  30.8 5.6 36.9 22.1 
64  26.9 4.1 37.2 17.2 
65  11.7 3.0 7.0 3.5 
66  19.3 46.9 3.7 29.1 
67  7.1 20.0 0.4 14.8 
68  2.3 19.4 0.1 5.2 
69  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
70  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Av. Ret. Age  64.5 66.3 63.5 64.9 
P(RA>NRA)  28.9 86.3 4.2 49.1 
 
Notes: Simulated distribution of retirement ages (frequency in %) for the base case. Assumed 
parameters: relative risk aversion ߩ ൌ 5, bequest motive strength ܾ ൌ 0, time preference 
ߚ ൌ 0.97, leisure preference ߙ ൌ 1.3, normal retirement age ܴܰܣ ൌ 65, early retirement age 
ܧܴܣ ൌ 62, latest retirement age ܮܴܣ ൌ 70, Social Security replacement rate ߣ ൌ 0.6; 
financially sophisticated households with access to the stock market. Annuity: delayed 
retirement benefits are paid as a lifelong increase of the pension annuity. Lump Sum: delayed 
retirement benefits are paid as an actuarially fair one-time lump sum at retirement. 
P(RA>NRA): simulated frequency (in %) of retirement after the normal retirement age. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 2: Impact of Lump Sum vs. Annuity Reward for Delayed Retirement on Retirement Age: Alternative Calibrations 
Age 20 Age 60
Annuity Lump Sum Annuity Lump Sum
Av. Ret. Age P(RA>NRA) Av. Ret. Age P(RA>NRA) Av. Ret. Age P(RA>NRA) Av. Ret. Age P(RA>NRA)
A. Financially Sophisticated             
Base Case  64.5 0.289 66.3 0.863 63.5 0.042 64.9 0.491
Alternative Household Preferences 
ܾ ൌ 2   64.3 0.235 66.2 0.859 63.3 0.022 64.6 0.460
ܾ ൌ 5   64.3 0.240 66.2 0.844 63.3 0.023 64.4 0.409
ߚ ൌ 0.96   64.0 0.172 65.2 0.541 63.2 0.013 63.9 0.254
ߚ ൌ 0.99   65.4 0.536 66.4 0.887 64.0 0.136 65.7 0.738
ߩ ൌ 2   62.7 0.001 64.3 0.351 63.6 0.014 66.9 0.935
ߩ ൌ 8   63.0 0.028 62.9 0.002 62.5 0.000 62.5 0.000
ߙ ൌ 0.7   68.8 0.955 68.3 0.934 68.1 0.993 68.3 0.995
ߙ ൌ 1.9   62.6 0.007 62.7 0.016 62.5 0.000 62.5 0.002
Alternative Retirement System Parameters
ߣ ൌ 0.45   67.2 0.927 67.3 0.927 66.8 0.976 67.4 0.990
ܴܰܣ ൌ 67 (for age 20)   65.3 0.068 65.6 0.187 na na na na
B. Financially Unsophisticated             
Base Case  67.0 0.898 66.7 0.963   63.9 0.092 64.0 0.186
ߩ	= 2   65.1 0.587 67.2 0.969   64.9 0.267 66.2 0.882
ߩ	= 8   64.2 0.257 63.7 0.091   62.7 0.001 62.7 0.000
 
Notes: Panel A (B) refers to simulated retirement patterns of households with (without) access to the stock market.  P(RA>NRA): simulated 
frequency of retirement ages (RA) older than the normal retirement age (NRA). Annuity: delayed retirement credit paid as increase in Social 
Security lifetime benefit. Lump Sum: delayed retirement credit paid as an actuarially fair one-time lump sum at retirement. For base case parameters 
see Table 1. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3: Welfare Implications of Lump Sum vs. Annuity Reward for Delayed 
Retirement  
Age 20 Age 60 
A. Financially Sophisticated 
Base Case  ‐0.001 0.041 
Alternative Household Preferences   
ܾ ൌ 2   ‐0.001 0.043 
ܾ ൌ 5   ‐0.001 0.042 
ߚ ൌ 0.96   0.000 0.028 
ߚ ൌ 0.99   ‐0.005 0.078 
ߩ ൌ 2   0.000 0.289 
ߩ ൌ 8   ‐0.006 0.000 
ߙ ൌ 0.7   ‐0.008 0.343 
ߙ ൌ 1.9   ‐0.001 0.000 
 
Alternative Retirement System Parameters
ߣ ൌ 0.45   ‐0.005 0.223 
ܴܰܣ ൌ 67   ‐0.001 na 
B. Financially Unsophisticated
Base Case  ‐0.020 0.008 
ߩ ൌ 2   0.000 0.177 
ߩ ൌ 8   ‐0.101 0.000 
 
Notes: Welfare increases (in multiples of labor income as of age 20/60) from paying the 
delayed retirement credit as an actuarially fair one-time lump sum at retirement instead of an 
increase in the Social Security lifetime benefit. Base case calibration: relative risk aversion 
ߩ ൌ 5, bequest motive strength ܾ ൌ 0, time preference ߚ ൌ 0.97, leisure preference ߙ ൌ 1.3, 
normal retirement age ܴܰܣ ൌ 65, early retirement age ܧܴܣ ൌ 62, latest retirement age 
ܮܴܣ ൌ 70, Social Security replacement rate ߣ ൌ 0.6. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
